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This paper studies the implications of introducing child care in the human capital production
function for the assessment of the e®ects of labor income taxation on growth.
Recent literature focuses on the impact of taxation on the allocation of time between
market labor, leisure and home production and it concludes that the cross-country di®erences
in labor income taxation contribute to explain the cross-country di®erences in time allocation
(see for instance Rogerson 2007 and Ragan 2006), with leisure and home production being,
ceteris paribus, higher in countries where taxation is higher. Child care is among the home
produced goods.
Di®erently from the existing literature which views child care only as a consumption good,
we here model it not only as such but also as an input which enters the human capital produc-
tion function. In doing so, we follow the received literature on the role of early environments
on child development. The issue has been widely analyzed, especially in the psychology and
sociology literature. Economists have more recently recognized the importance of parental
time and child care on skills' acquisition (see Bernal 2008 for a review of the most recent
contributions).
We develop a three-period OLG growth model where formal schooling and child care enter
the production function of human capital as complements. Child care depends on the time
that parents dedicate to child rearing and on the expenditure on goods and services which
may impinge on the child development (e.g books or toys, day care centers' services, pre-
school programs, baby-sitting). We compare a model where child care does not a®ect child
development and a model where it does. While in the former set-up labor income taxation
a®ects human capital accumulation only through the decision to invest in formal schooling, in
the second framework, it also in°uences both directly and indirectly the growth rate through
the change in the time parents devote to child care and the variation in the amount of child
care expenditure. The direct e®ect goes through the impact of the change in child care on
human capital, for a given level of formal schooling; the indirect e®ect passes through the
complementarity between formal schooling and child care in the process of skills' formation.
These are the new channels identi¯ed by the paper through which taxation has an impact on
growth.
To explore these new channels and quantitatively assess their relevance we perform a
numerical analysis of the model. When taxes are reduced, the net wage goes up inducing
2people to work more and dedicate less time to child care; this reduction in parental care may
be compensated by an increase in the amount of child care expenditure. The overall impact
of a cut in the tax rate on the formation of children's abilities depends on the elasticity of
substitution between parental time and expenditure in the production of child care. If this
elasticity is low, the rate of transmission of skills during childhood is weakened and the growth
rate rises less than in a model where child care does not a®ect human capital accumulation.
The opposite holds if this elasticity is high. We ¯nd that, quantitatively, the omission of
child care from the technology of skills' formation can signi¯cantly bias the results related
to the e®ects of taxation on growth: when parental care and child care services are hardly
substitutable, the elasticity of the growth rate to labor income taxation is six times higher in
a model which ignores the role played by child care in child development.
The elasticity of substitution between parental time and child care expenditure can be
interpreted as an indicator of the quality of child care services relative to parental care. Thus,
from a policy-oriented perspective, our results show that the cuts in labor income taxation have
a strong impact on labor force participation and growth only when high quality non-parental
care is available. We will elaborate more on this point in the conclusions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some evidence supporting the
main mechanisms at work in our framework. In Section 3 we describe the building blocks
of the model, we derive the ¯rst order conditions for consumers and ¯rms and we de¯ne the
intertemporal equilibrium and the balanced growth path. In Section 4 we perform a numerical
analysis of the e®ects of taxation, comparing a model where child care matters for the process
of skills' formation with a model where it does not. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
presents a sensitivity analysis on some of the parameters of the model.
2 Empirical evidence
Starting from the seminal work of Prescott (2004), recent literature (e.g. Rogerson 2007, Ragan
2006, Ohanian, Ra®o, and Rogerson 2007) identi¯es a causal relationship between taxation
and the allocation of time between market work, leisure and home production. It has been
shown that, ceteris paribus, lower taxes deliver an increase in market work and a reduction in
leisure and in the time devoted to home production.1 For the purpose of our paper, one needs
1Taxes are one of the key factors which explain the cross-country di®erences in time allocation. To explain
the time allocation in Scandinavian countries, the types of expenditures which are ¯nanced by higher taxation
3to check that the increase in market work goes with a reduction in the time dedicated to one
speci¯c home-produced good, that is child care. Indeed, there are two main mechanisms at
work in our paper: the existence of a trade-o® between time devoted to market work and time
devoted to child care and the impact of child care arrangements on human capital development.
To support the view that changes in market work also a®ect time dedicated to child care, we
analyze data on time use taken from HETUS (Harmonised European Time Use Survey). We
consider 9 countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
UK) and look at the sample of married or cohabiting individuals with the youngest dependent
child below 6. We look for a measure of child care provided by parents: to this end, we select
the activities recorded as \Physical care and supervision of child" and \Teaching, reading and
talking with child" and coded as primary activities; we then add secondary child care.2 This
is a relatively narrow notion of child care as it does not include the time that parents spend
not engaged in explicit child-related activities, but still in the presence of the children. We
think that the narrow notion of child care we use better represents deliberate time devoted to
kids, which is the choice variable in our model.
In Figure 1 we look at the percentages of those reporting any time in either primary or
secondary child care and in Figure 2 we plot the minutes they devote to these activities.
We distinguish between working and non-working individuals3 and ¯nd that, in all countries,
non working individuals have higher participation rates to the above mentioned activities and
dedicate them more time.4 We have also checked that this holds even when controlling for the
number of children. These correlations suggests that there is a trade-o® between market work
and parental time devoted to child care.
Cawley and Liu (2007), using ATUS (American Time Use Survey) data, provide evidence
of the existence of a causal relationship between maternal employment and time devoted to
should also be considered.
2In HETUS, people are required to report both the main/primary activity they are involved in (\What did
you do?") and the parallel/secondary activity they are doing (\Did you do anything else? If so, what?")
3Working parents include the categories \Employed full time" and \Employed part time"; non-working par-
ents include the following categories: \On leave", \Unemployed", \Ful¯lling domestic tasks", \On retirement".
4The only partial exception concerns secondary child care in France. As we can see in Figure 2, average
time devoted to this activity - conditional on participation - is slightly higher for working individuals. However
notice that, since non-working people participate more in secondary child care, the overall average time devoted
to this activity (given by the participation rate times minutes dedicated to the activity by those participating)
is still higher for non-working parents.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6children. They control for various characteristics of mothers (e.g. education, race, marital
status, age, number of children, age of the youngest children, whether the spouse - if any - is
working or not) and estimate models with instrumental variables to deal with possible endo-
geneity problems: their result is that employed women spend signi¯cantly less time reading to
their children, helping them with homework, and in educational activities in general. They in-
terpret these ¯ndings as o®ering plausible mechanisms for the negative association -suggested
by part of the literature- between maternal employment and child cognitive development.
Indeed, the family plays an important role in shaping the early environments in which
children grow up. The importance of parental time vs. other types of child care in producing
children abilities is analyzed in the empirical literature. The earlier contributions - as surveyed
for instance by Ruhm (2004) - reach mixed conclusions. Some more recent studies tend to
identify a negative impact of maternal employment on child care. Baker, Gruber, and Milligan
(2005) for example, using Canadian data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children
and Youth (NLSCY), ¯nd that the increase in maternal employment following the introduction
of universal child care in Quebec at the end of the Nineties made children worse o® in a
variety of behavioral and health-related dimensions. Other papers use US data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY): Baum (2003) shows that maternal work in
the ¯rst year of a child's life has detrimental e®ects on his cognitive skills. The analysis
of Ruhm (2004) documents a negative relationship between maternal employment and child
development, which is stronger for the reading and mathematics achievement of ¯ve- and six-
year-olds than for the more commonly examined verbal ability of three- and four-year-olds.
Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane (2007, 2008) also ¯nd that, on average, the substitution
of maternal time with other child care sources produces negative and rather sizable e®ects
on children skills. However, the last two papers show that this result masks some di®erences
across types of child care and maternal education. Only informal care leads to signi¯cant
reductions in child achievement; formal care (i.e. center-based care and preschool) does not
have an adverse e®ect on cognitive outcomes and may have positive e®ects on children of
poorly educated mothers. In other terms, the counterfactual to the absence of maternal care
and the group under investigation matter in determining the results. This is documented also
in Heckman and Masterov (2007) who review the evidence supporting the idea that high quality
preschool centers available to disadvantaged children on a voluntary basis, coupled with home
visitation programs, are highly e®ective in promoting achievement for disadvantaged children.
7Whatever the precise sign of the e®ects identi¯ed, the conclusion which matters most for our
investigation are that not only genetics but also parental choices in terms of time allocation and
purchase of services a®ect the children's process of skill formation; moreover, that the quality
of non-parental care plays a role in determining the children's outcomes. Similar conclusions
can also be drawn looking at the review of the available evidence presented in OECD (2007).
Finally, we remark that what happens early in life a®ects the entire individual's skill
formation process. This is described by recent literature (see Cuhna et al. 2005 for a review) as
a dynamic process, characterized by strong complementarities between its di®erent phases. As
there are critical and sensitive periods for the development of both cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities, later remediation for early de¯cits in the formation of some important abilities is
di±cult and costly. Some evidence suggests for example that the IQ can be a®ected by the
environment in which the children live until the age of 10, but not later. Early investments
not only have a direct impact on the level of human capital of an individual. As there is
complementarity between investments at di®erent stages, they make further investments more
productive (skill begets skill). Carneiro and Heckman (2002, 2003), for instance, suggest
that the most important factor explaining the positive relation between income and college
enrollment in the US is not related to short term liquidity constraints that poor individuals
may face, but to the fact that they lived in early environments which were unable to form
the cognitive and non-cognitive abilities required for success in school. This complementarity
between formal schooling and skills acquired during childhood is also documented in Leibowitz
(2003)5 and it is another key ingredient in our modeling strategy.
3 The model
We develop an OLG model with intragenerational homogeneity and endogenous growth driven
by human capital accumulation. The model is set up in discrete time, from 0 to in¯nity. Agents
have perfect foresight on future variables. They live for three periods and they have one child
in the second period of life; the population growth rate is zero and fertility is exogenous; the
size of each generation is normalized to 1.
Our formalization of the allocation of time and resources - whose details are presented in
Section 3.1 - is quite standard and it has been for example used by Rogerson (2007) and Ragan
5See also the references quoted therein.
8(2006) to discuss the e®ect of taxation on the allocation of time between labor, leisure and
home production; the home produced good is interpreted as child care provided by parents
through their own time and through the purchase of goods and services (e.g books or toys,
day care centers' services, pre-school programs, baby-sitting).
The novelty of our model relies in the technology of human capital accumulation, which is
described in Section 3.2: following the evidence reported in the previous Section, we explore
the possibility that human capital not only depends on schooling but also on child care. In
other terms, we study the consequences (as far as the growth impact of labor income taxation
is concerned) of treating the home produced good not simply as a consumption good but also
as a good which fosters human capital accumulation.
First order conditions for the optimization problems of the consumers and ¯rms are pre-
sented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 de¯nes the intertemporal equilibrium and the balanced
growth path.
3.1 Basic set-up
The time structure of individual choices is the following. In the ¯rst period of life, the child/the
young receives child care and invests in formal schooling, borrowing on the capital market.
In the second period of life the middle-aged/the parent pays back her loan and decides: how
much to consume and save; how much time to devote to labor, leisure and child care; how
much to spend on child care. In the third period of life, the old agent retires and consumes all
her income.
In each period one physical good is produced using capital and labor measured in e±ciency
units. This good can be used for consumption, for investment in physical capital, for schooling
expenditure and for child care expenditure.
Preferences
Preferences of an agent born at t are described by the following utility function:








t+2 denote respectively consumption when middle-aged and old as no con-
sumption takes place, by assumption, during childhood; zt+1 stands for leisure time; xt+1
indicates the home produced good; ij (with j = 1;2;3 and
P
j ij = 1) are positive parameters
determining the weight of consumption, leisure and home production in the utility function;
90 < µ < 1 is the subjective discount factor; · is a parameter · 1.
As we said, we interpret the home produced good xt+1 as child care.
Child care
Child care xt+1 is developed according to the following production function:
xt+1 = [¾('t+1)º + (1 ¡ ¾)(nt+1ht+1)º]
1
º (2)
where 't+1 indicates child care expenditure; nt+1 is the time parents devote to child rearing;
ht+1 is parents' human capital; 0 < ¾ < 1 is a parameter determining the relative importance
of child care expenditure and family time in the production of child care; º · 1 is a parameter
governing the elasticity of substitution between 't+1 and nt+1; ³º = 1
1¡º.
As equation (2) suggests, child care outcomes depend on the productivity of the time
devoted to it, that is, they depend on the human capital of the providers: parents with a high
level of human capital ht+1 can provide a given level of child care xt+1 devoting to it a lower
amount of time nt+1 than low educated parents.
Government's budget constraints
The government budget constraint at t + 1 is the following:
¿t+1wt+1ht+1lt+1 = Tt+1 (3)
where ¿t+1 is the tax rate on labor income; wt+1 is the wage; lt+1 is the labor supply of
the middle-aged; Tt+1 is the lump-sum transfer paid back to them. We consider ¿t+1 as the
exogenous policy variable, while Tt+1 is endogenously determined to guarantee the equilibrium
in the budget constraint.
The assumption that tax proceeds are returned to the same individual as lump-sum trans-
fers excludes intergenerational redistribution, it allows to isolate the e®ects of taxation from
those of government expenditure and it is often present in the literature (e.g. King and Rebelo
1990, Stokey and Sergio 1995, Ihori 2001).
Individual budget constraints
A child born at time t decides the amount of resources et to devote to formal schooling.
We assume that she borrows at the interest rate rt+1 on the capital market and she pays back
her loan in the second period.
The time and budget constraints are:
lt+1 + zt+1 + nt+1 = 1 (4)
10cm
t+1 = wt+1ht+1lt+1(1 ¡ ¿t+1) ¡ st+1 + Tt+1 ¡ 't+1 ¡ (1 + rt+1)et (5)
co
t+2 = (1 + rt+2)st+1 (6)
where st+1 are savings and where all the other variables have the same meaning as elucidated
before.
Production function




where Kt+1 is the capital stock, Lt+1 = lt+1ht+1 is the labor supply in e±ciency units, and
0 < ± < 1 is the share of capital income in output.
3.2 Human capital production function
We consider two alternative human capital production functions. In the ¯rst one, human
capital ht+1 depends both on formal schooling et and on child care xt:
ht+1 = q [¸(et)½ + (1 ¡ ¸)(xt)½]
1
½ (8)
where q > 0 is a scale parameter; 0 < ¸ < 1 is a parameter determining the relative im-
portance of formal schooling and child care in the production of human capital; ½ · 1 is a
parameter governing the elasticity of substitution between formal schooling and child care
³½ = 1
1¡½. The above production function captures the idea that, depending on the degree of
complementarity/substitutability between et and xt; early investments via child care can have
permanent e®ects on educational outcomes and that early additions to a child's human capital
may enhance the return of schooling investments.
In the second one, human capital depends, as it is usual, on schooling and on the human
capital of the previous generation:
ht+1 = q [¸(et)½ + (1 ¡ ¸)(ht)½]
1
½ (9)
The comparison between these two technologies allows us to assess the relevance of considering
child care in the process of skills' formation, as far as the e®ects of taxation on growth are
concerned.
Notice that early environments feature in both formalizations of the human capital produc-
tion function: indeed, one may interpret the human capital of the previous generation in (9)
11as a measure of early environments. These, however, are not the result of child care choices,
as it happens in (8).
3.3 First order conditions
Consumer's optimization problem
We solve the consumer optimization problem in two steps.
In the ¯rst step the representative individual born at t chooses time nt+1 and expenditure
't+1 in order to minimize the cost of producing a given amount of child care xt+1. Such a cost
is equal to:
't+1 + (1 ¡ ¿t+1)wt+1ht+1nt+1 (10)
that is, expenditure on childcare plus forgone earnings due to the time spent in child care.
Thus the agent minimizes equation (10) subject to the technology of child care production (2).
This is a standard minimization problem which gives as a solution the following expenditure
function:
Ct+1(xt+1;º;¾;¿t+1) = ¡(º;¾;¿t+1)xt+1 (11)


























is the resource cost of producing one unit of child care. Since we are going to discuss the e®ects






















that is, ¡(º;¾;¿t+1) is decreasing in ¿t+1: indeed, foregone earnings due to time devoted to
child rearing are higher when the tax rate is lower.
In the second step of the optimization problem, the agent chooses et, xt+1, lt+1, st+1, taking
into account the results of the minimization problem solved above. Using the time constraint
(4), the budget constraint of the adult (5) can be rewritten as:
cm
t+1 = (1 ¡ ¿t+1)wt+1ht+1(1 ¡ zt+1 ¡ nt+1) ¡ 't+1 ¡ st+1 + Tt+1 ¡ (1 + rt+1)et (16)
12which, using the expenditure function (11), becomes:
cm
t+1 = (1 ¡ ¿t+1)wt+1ht+1(1 ¡ zt+1) ¡ ¡(º;¾;¿t+1)xt+1 ¡ st+1 + Tt+1 ¡ (1 + rt+1)et (17)
Thus the agent maximizes the utility function (1) subject to the new budget constraint (17),
the budget constraint (6), the time constraint (4) and the technology of skill formation (8) or
(9).
Independently of the technology of skills' formation, the ¯rst order conditions for the choice























The ¯rst order conditions for saving and labor, respectively given by equations (18) and (19),
are the usual ones. Equation (20) concerns the choice of the home produced good, i.e. child
care. The right hand side is the marginal bene¯t of the home produced good xt+1. The left
hand side is its marginal cost: it is given by the amount of consumption an agents should give





When the human capital production function is given by equation (8), the choice of the
investment in education et is characterized by:
et : (1 + rt+1) = q(1 ¡ ¿t+1)wt+1lt+1




If skills are accumulated according to equation (9), the ¯rst order condition for the choice of
et is given by:
et : (1 + rt+1) = q(1 ¡ ¿t+1)wt+1lt+1




The left hand side of equations (21) and (22) is the cost of an additional unit of et and it
depends on the interest rate, since young agents borrow resources on the capital market to
¯nance their investment in schooling. The right hand side is the marginal bene¯t of schooling
which is the change in net labor income due to the increased human capital level.6 Notice
6In deriving equations (21) and (22) we assume that agents invest in education to enhance their own produc-
tivity on the labor market. The fact that human capital of a generation is also relevant for the human capital
of the next one is treated, as it is often done, as an externality.
13that, di®erently from equation (22), in equation (21) child care choices a®ect the return from
schooling: a higher value of child care increases, ceteris paribus, the return from investing in
schooling. We take up this remark later when we discuss the e®ects of taxation on growth (see
Section 4.2).
Firm's optimization problem
Full depreciation of capital is assumed. Pro¯t maximizing behavior of the competitive
¯rms implies that the interest rate is:






and that the wage in e±ciency units is:






which are the standard conditions.
3.4 Intertemporal equilibrium and balanced growth path
We here de¯ne the intertemporal equilibrium. We focus on the case of a small open economy, in
which the interest rate is exogenously ¯xed at the world level and it is assumed to be constant
over time; as a consequence, the wage rate, according to the ¯rm's ¯rst order conditions (23)
and (24), is also constant.
Taking as given the initial level of savings s¡1 and of human capital h0, the sequence of
the exogenous policy parameter f¿tg1
0 , the interest rate r and the wage w, an intertemporal
equilibrium is de¯ned by a sequence fet,cm
t ,st,co
t,lt,'t,zt,nt,ht,Kt,Ttg1
0 that satis¯es: the gov-
ernment budget constraint (3); the technology for the ¯nal output (7); the production function
for human capital (8) or (9); the agent's maximization problem, characterized by equations
(4), (6), (12) - (14), (17) - (20) and (21) or (22) and the clearing condition for the labor market.
Dividing the equations de¯ning the intertemporal equilibrium by the level of human cap-
ital, it is possible to obtain their stationarized version. A balanced growth path (BGP) is,
by de¯nition, the steady state of such stationarized system and its existence requires the as-
sumption that ¿t = ¿ for all t. In other terms, a BGP is as an intertemporal equilibrium
such that flt,zt,ntg are constant and fet,cm
t ,st,co
t,'t,ht,Kt,Ttg grow at a constant common rate
gt+1 = g =
ht+1
ht .
If the human capital equation is (8), g can be written as:
g = q [¸(e e)½ + (1 ¡ ¸)(e x)½]
1
½ (25)
14where e e = et
ht and e x = xt
ht.
If the human capital equation is (9), g is equal to:
g = q [¸(e e)½ + (1 ¡ ¸)]
1
½ (26)
In our analysis, we focus on the e®ects of a change in taxation on the balanced growth path.7
According to equation (25), the growth rate is a function of e e and of e x. Intuitively, taxation
a®ects, on the one hand, the returns to education because it alters both the net wage and the
working time: this is the standard e®ect studied in the literature, which is also captured by
equation (26). On the other hand, it changes the time parents devote to child care and it
modi¯es the amount of child care expenditure: if the role played by child care in the process
of skills' formation is recognized, as it is in (25), these changes in early environments have an
impact on human capital accumulation.
To explore these e®ects and investigate how they combine and a®ect the growth rate, in
the following Section we perform a numerical analysis of the model.
4 Numerical analysis
In this Section we perform a quantitative comparison, as far as the e®ects of taxation are con-
cerned, of the two model economies described in Section 3, which only di®er in the technology
of skills' formation. In the ¯rst economy (henceforth: Model 1) human capital is produced
according to the technology (9) and the growth rate can be written as in equation (26). The
second model (henceforth: Model 2) is characterized by the human capital production function
(8) and thus the growth rate is given by equation (25).
The purpose of such a comparison is to understand if and how the recognition of the role
played by child care in the process of skills formation a®ects the growth impact of taxation.
4.1 Parameterization and Calibration
The ¯rst step is to assign a value to the parameters of the model.
We assume that each period has a length of 25 years. The world annual interest rate is
set to 4:5%. The intertemporal discount factor µ is set to 0:37 (the quarterly discount factor
7Though the focus is not directly on individual utility and social welfare, we stress that in the long run the
higher the growth rate, the higher the individual utility.
15is 0:99). We choose ± = 0:29, that is the share of capital income in national product amounts
to 29% (see Bouzahzah, de la Croix, and Docquier 2002).
The parameter q of the human capital production function is chosen in order to obtain an
annual growth rate equal to 1:8%.
The parameter ¾ in the production of child care is chosen to match a value for the ratio
between child care expenditure and total consumption (i.e. the sum of consumption of the
adult and of the old) equal to 1:5%, which is in the middle of the range of values reported by
Ragan (2006).
We choose ij with j = 1;2;3 in order to generate a realistic allocation of time between labor,
child care and leisure. For this purpose we consider average data coming from the Harmonized
European Time Use Survey (HETUS).8 Assuming, as it is usually done (e.g. Ragan 2006,
Cardia and Ng 2003, Juster 1985), that non-personal time available for discretionary use
amounts to 100 hours per week, we have: l = 32%; n = 6% and z = 62%. Two remarks
are important in interpreting these data. First, child care is simply de¯ned as the sum of
the minutes registered as devoted to primary and secondary child care: this amount of time,
as stressed in Section 2, is lower than the total time spent with children. Second, leisure is
here de¯ned as a residual category, that is, it is the time not spent either working or doing
primary and secondary child care: as a consequence, it is not a measure of pure leisure as it
also includes housework.
As far as the choice of ¸ and ¿ is concerned, we use average data computed for the same set
of countries considered for determining the allocation of time. In particular, the parameter ¸ is
set in order to match a ratio between expenditure on formal schooling and GDP equal to 5:7%,
which is the average of the total (public plus private) expenditure on education. Though we
do not have public education in the model, we consider the total expenditure on education and
not just the private one since our government budget constraint (3) is consistent with perfect
substitution between public and private expenditure. The policy parameter ¿ is chosen equal
to 53%, which is the average of the marginal tax rates on labor income computed by Dhont
and Heylen (2008) using OECD data.
Finally, we need to set º, ½ and ·. The ¯rst two parameters respectively determine the
8The countries we consider are again: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden
and UK. Data refers to people in the age group 25-50, which correspond in our three period OLG model to
people in their second period of life.
16elasticity of substitution between child care expenditure and parental time ³º = 1
1¡º and the
elasticity of substitution between formal schooling and child care ³½ = 1
1¡½; · is the parameter
which appears in equation (1) for the utility of leisure.
As far º is concerned, some estimates are available. Estimates coming both from aggregate
data (McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright 1997 and Chang and Schorfheide 2003) and from
micro data (Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright 1995 and Aguiar and Hurst 2005) suggest a value
in the range [0:4;0:6]. However, these estimates refer to a large set of home produced goods.
When the focus is on child care the estimates could be di®erent. Moreover, notice that the
parameter º can be interpreted as the quality of child care services provided; it is not easy to
measure precisely this quality, but there are some indications that it is quite di®erent across
countries (see the OECD Family data base). Though it is di±cult to pin down a precise value
for º, the above discussion suggests that reasonable values should be between 0 and 1. Thus
we perform a sensitivity analysis in this range.
There are no well established estimates for ½. However, there are reasons to think that
the degree of substitutability between child care and formal schooling is quite low (see the
references in Section 2). In standard macroeconomic models, which describe human capital
accumulation using equation (9), the choice is usually ½ = 0, i.e. a Cobb-Douglas speci¯ca-
tion. We adopt this parametrization and, in the Appendix, we perform a sensitivity analysis
exploring the e®ect of choosing lower values of ½.
Finally, we choose · = ¡4. The implied wage elasticity of the uncompensated labor supply
obviously depends on º: when º is between 0 and 0:4, it is equal to approximately 0:4: It goes
to 1:8 when º = 0:98 (with intermediate values equal to: 0:5 when º = 0:8; 0:7 when º = 0:9;
1:2 when º = 0:95).9 These values may appear high if compared with the microeconometric
estimates: the meta analysis of Evers, De Mooij, and Van Vuren (2008) suggests a value for
the wage elasticity of uncompensated labor supply equal to 0:1 for men and 0:5 for women.
However, it has been stressed that macro and micro elasticities need not to be the same: the
former can be much higher than the latter (Rogerson and Wallenius 2007, Chang and Kim
2006, Fiorito and Zanella 2008). Nonetheless, in the Appendix we argue that our ¯ndings are
robust to the choice of lower values of ·.
9The wage elasticity of the uncompensated labor supply is de¯ned as the percentage change in hours worked
as a result of a one percent change in the net wage rate (1 ¡ ¿)w. It can be computed as
1¡¿
¿ ´ where ´ is the
elasticity of the uncompensated labor supply with respect to the tax rate ¿, which can be derived from Table
2 of Section 4.2.
17Table 1: Parameterization and Calibration
Tax rate ¿ 53:3%
Share of capital income ± 29%
Discount factor µ 0:37
Weights in the utility function ij chosen to match the allocation of time between
labor (32%), time devoted to children (6%) and leisure (62%).
Weight of formal schooling ¸ chosen to match
a ratio between total expenditure on formal schooling and GDP
equal to 5:7%
Weight of childcare expenditure ¾ chosen to match
a ratio between child care expenditures and consumption
equal to 1:5%
Elasticity of substitution between ³º = 1
1¡º Sensitivity analysis in the range 0 · º < 1
child care expenditures and parental time
Elasticity of substitution between ³½ = 1
1¡½ = 1 (½ = 0 i.e. Cobb-Douglas case)
formal schooling and early environments
Parameter of the utility of leisure ¡z·
· · = ¡4
The implied wage elasticity of uncompensated labor supply
goes from 0:41 to 1:77 (depending on the value of º)
It is important to stress that the parameters r, µ, ±, ¿, º, ½ and · are the same in the
two economies we compare. On the other hand the values of ¾, ¶j and ¸, i.e. the calibrated
parameters, may di®er in Model 1 and 2 since they are chosen to match the target values
described above: in other terms, we want to compare economies which di®er in the technology
of skills' formation but are observationally equivalent.
The assumptions underlying the numerical simulation are summarized in Table 1.
4.2 Simulation's results
We compute the e®ects of a 10% reduction in labor income taxation , i.e. a reduction of ¿
from 53% to 47:7%, both in Model 1 and in Model 2. The results are presented in Table 2, in
which values relative to ¿ = 53% are reported10. The e denotes a stationarized variable.
We notice that the e®ects of taxation are the same in the two models for all the variables
but for g and e e, whose reactions to ¿ depend on the presence of child care in the process of
10In other terms, Table 2 reports the ratio between the value of a variable when ¿ = 47:7% and when ¿ = 53%.
18Table 2: E®ects of a 10% reduction in the tax rate on labor income
º = 0:0 º = 0:4 º = 0:8 º = 0:9 º = 0:95 º = 0:98
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
g 1:17 1:03 1:17 1:03 1:18 1:06 1:21 1:11 1:26 1:22 1:22 1:39
e e 1:25 1:18 1:26 1:18 1:28 1:21 1:32 1:26 1:41 1:39 1:54 1:59
e x 0:94 0:94 0:95 0:96 0:98 1:03
l 1:05 1:05 1:06 1:08 1:13 1:20
n 0:92 0:91 0:84 0:71 0:41 0:03
z 0:98 0:98 0:98 0:99 0:99 0:99
e ' 1:02 1:09 1:43 2:06 3:46 5:43
e cm 1:02 1:03 1:03 1:03 1:05 1:07
¡(º;¾;¿) 1:09 1:09 1:09 1:08 1:06 1:03
skills' formation.
To discuss the main results of Table 2 and to provide the intuition behind them, we ¯rst
focus on changes in e x. Then we turn to the explanation of the di®erent results for g and e e
that are obtained in Model 1 and in Model 2, i.e. when e x is respectively omitted from and
included in the human capital production function.
The mechanisms determining the changes of e x can be intuitively grasped as follows. Di-
viding both sides of equation (20) by the level of human capital, it is possible to characterize








where e cm =
cm
t
ht . As it can be seen from equation (15), a decrease in the tax rate rises ¡(º;¾;¿),
that is the amount of consumption an agent should give up in order to produce one unit of
child care: indeed, foregone earnings due to time devoted to child rearing are now higher.
However the evaluation of ¡(º;¾;¿) in terms of utility decreases, since the marginal utility of
consumption goes down as e cm rises in our computational experiment.
In other terms, there are what we could call a substitution e®ect - passing through ¡(º;¾;¿)
- and an income e®ect - passing through e cm - which go in opposite directions: the overall impact
on e x depends on the values of º. If it is very easy to substitute parental time with child
care expenditure (i.e º = 0:98 in Table 2), e x rises; when this substitution is more di±cult,
e x decreases. This can be intuitively understood looking in Table 2 at how the changes in
¡(º;¾;¿) and e cm are a®ected by º. Indeed, the lower the substitutability between child care
19expenditure and parental time, the larger the increase in ¡(º;¾;¿) and the smaller the increase
in e cm.
The change in e x is driven by adjustments in the inputs of child care, that is parental time
and child care expenditure. In our simulation, parental care n always decreases and child care
expenditure as a share of human capital e ' =
't
ht always rises, with the former variation not
compensating (more than compensating) the latter when e x decreases (increases).
Once we have provided the intuition for the changes in e x, we focus on the di®erent e®ect
that taxation has on the growth rate and on the stationarized investment in formal schooling
in Model 1 and 2.
In Model 1, the growth rate g only depends on e e, whose choice is characterized by the
following stationarized version of equation (22)(with ½ = 0):






Once the tax rate is reduced, the net wage (1¡¿)w and the labor supply l rise, increasing the
bene¯t from investing in formal schooling: this tends to induce a higher level of e e.
In Model 2, formal schooling is not the only way to produce skills: child care plays a role
in the process of human capital accumulation. The changes in e x discussed above a®ect both
directly and indirectly the growth rate. The direct e®ect goes through the impact of the change
in child care on human capital, for a given level of formal schooling: this can be immediately
understood from equation (25). The indirect impact passes through the complementarity
between formal schooling and child care, which implies that e e is a®ected by a variation of e x,
as it can be realized from the following stationarized version of the ¯rst order condition (21)
(with ½ = 0):






This indirect channel can be identi¯ed looking at the di®erent impact that taxation has on e e
in Model 1 and 2 (see Table 2): in the case where e x goes down, the change of e e is lower in the
latter model; the opposite holds when e x rises.
These e®ects (both the direct and the indirect one) explain why, in Table 2, the growth
rate rises more in Model 2 than in Model 1 when º is very high: indeed, in such a case e x rises.
The opposite holds when º is lower, since in this case e x decreases.
Once we have explained the general qualitative patterns of the analysis, we focus on the
quantitative ¯ndings. For low values of º, i.e. º = 0 and º = 0:4, the elasticity of the growth
20rate to labor income taxation is six times higher in Model 1 than in Model 2.11 When º rises,
the ratio between the values of this elasticity in the two models tends to decrease. It is equal
to: 3, when º = 0:8; 2, when º = 0:9; 1:2, when º = 0:95. When º = 0:98, this ratio is 0:6: as
we have already said, in this case the e®ect of taxation is higher once child care is included in
the human capital production function. Thus we can conclude that the omission of child care
from the technology of skills' formation can signi¯cantly bias the results related to the e®ects
of taxation on growth; the sign and the magnitude of this bias depend on º.
To correctly understand the results, it is important to remind that e x is de¯ned as xt
ht, i.e.
the ratio between the skills received during childhood xt and the human capital of the previous
generation ht. In other terms, e x can be interpreted in Model 2 as the rate of intergenerational
transmission of skills in early environments. As a consequence, a reduction in e x caused by
a tax cut should be read as a decrease in the rate of transmission of skills during childhood
and not necessarily as a reduction in their absolute level xt, as long as ht rises. Actually, in
our computational experiment, since the growth rate is higher when taxes are lower, we are
sure that in the very long run the level of human capital will be high enough to guarantee
that the skills received during childhood xt always increase after a cut in ¿, even when e x goes
down. Indeed, a highly educated generation transmitting to its children a low fraction of its
own human capital can still provide its kids with a higher level of skills than a low educated
generation transmitting a higher fraction of its given (lower) abilities.
We can thus summarize the main di®erence between the two models in the following way. In
Model 1 the e®ect of early environments on the process of skills' formation is simply captured
by the human capital of the previous generation which is automatically inherited by children.
As a consequence, the rate of transmission of skills during childhood is constant and it does
not depend on the tax rate. This is not true in the case of Model 2, in which human capital
accumulation is a®ected by child care choices: in this situation the rate of transmission of skills
e x reacts to taxation and the sign and the magnitude of the change depend on the elasticity of
substitution between parental time and child care.
As we remark in Section 4.1, this elasticity of substitution can be interpreted as a parameter
re°ecting the relative quality of available non parental care, which seems to be di®erent across
11The elasticity of the growth rate to labor income taxation is de¯ned as the percentage change in the growth
rate as a result of a one percent change in the tax rate on labor income. The values of this elasticity can be
immediately derived from the numbers presented in Table 2, subtracting 1 and then multiplying by 10.
21countries. Relying on this observation, the next Section sets the analysis we have performed
in the context of the current policy debate on the need to promote work-life balance policies.
5 Conclusions
The public debate is devoting increasing attention to the issue of the quality of child care
services. This is justi¯ed by the need to reconcile in a satisfactory way work and family
life, given the policy objective, shared by many countries, to increase (especially female) labor
supply. Such an objective has been for example formalized by the EU countries in the so called
Lisbon strategy, which ¯xed as a target an overall employment rate in excess of 70% and a
female employment rate in excess of 60% by 2010. The tax policy is seen as one important
means to achieve this goal.12
The quality of non-parental care is not only important to provide parents with a tool to
combine e®ectively work and family life. It is also important as a key factor to avoid damages
to and to promote the formation of children's abilities. In this perspective, quality standards of
child care services should not simply cover health and safety checks, rules on sta® certi¯cation
requirements, and sta®-to-child ratios, but they should also include child developmental goals
(OECD 2006, 2007).
In the paper we show that the role played by (the quality of) child care in the process
of skills' formation is also relevant from a macroeconomic point of view, being crucial in
determining the long-run e®ect of taxation and how the increase in labor force participation
a®ects economic performance, as measured by GDP growth. We ¯nd that the omission of
child care from the technology of skills' formation can signi¯cantly bias the results related to
the e®ects of labor income taxation on growth.
The analysis we have performed can be extended in several directions. The introduction
of endogenous fertility, agents' heterogeneity and an explicit gender dimension, seem the most
natural avenues to pursue. These extensions are left for future research.
12In this light one can read the proposal of gender-based taxation - recently put forward in Alesina, Ichino,
and Karabarbounis (2007)- as a tool to increase female labor supply .
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Appendix
In this Appendix we discuss the e®ects of choosing di®erent values for two parameters of the
model: ½, which determines the elasticity of substitution between formal schooling and child
care, and ·, which in°uences the wage elasticity of the uncompensated labor supply.
Sensitivity analysis on the complementarity between formal schooling and child care
The evidence presented in Section 2 suggests that the degree of substitutability between
formal schooling and child care should be low. In Section 4.1 we choose ½ = 0, i.e. a Cobb-
Douglas speci¯cation for the human capital production function. This choice is standard in
growth models where human capital accumulation is described by equation (9) and it implies
a su±ciently high degree of complementarity between formal schooling and child care. We
have also explored the e®ects of choosing a higher complementarity, i.e. ½ < 0. The result of
this sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table 3 which focuses on the e®ects of taxation on
the growth rate g.
The qualitative patterns are the same as those discussed in Section 4.2. Comparing Table
3 with Table 2 we see that the di®erence between Model 1 and Model 2 is quantitatively even
25Table 3: E®ects on the growth rate g of a 10% reduction in the tax rate on labor income
(½ < 0)
º = 0:0 º = 0:4 º = 0:8 º = 0:9 º = 0:95 º = 0:98
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
½ = ¡0:1 1:15 1:02 1:15 1:02 1:16 1:05 1:18 1:09 1:23 1:20 1:28 1:36
½ = ¡0:2 1:14 1:00 1:14 1:01 1:15 1:03 1:17 1:08 1:21 1:18 1:26 1:34
½ = ¡0:3 1:12 0:99 1:13 1:00 1:14 1:02 1:15 1:07 1:19 1:17 1:23 1:32
stronger (in particular for low values of º) when ½ < 0. The elasticity of the growth rate to
labor income taxation may be 35 times higher in Model 1 than in Model 2 (this happens when
º = 0 and ½ = ¡0:2). When the quality of non parental care is very low (º = 0) and the
complementarity between formal schooling and child care is high (½ = ¡0:3), the e®ect of a
reduction of the tax rate is even (slightly) negative in Model 2.
The intuition behind these ¯ndings is that, when ½ < 0, the indirect e®ect played by child
care in the process of skills' formation (see Section 4.2) is stronger.
Sensitivity analysis on the wage elasticity of uncompensated labor supply
In Section 4.1 we choose · = ¡4. We have stressed that this value implies a wage elasticity
of the uncompensated labor supply which can be considered high when compared to micro
estimates. We justi¯ed our choice by taking into account that it has been shown that macro
elasticities are likely to be higher than micro elasticities. Nonetheless, we here stress that lower
values of · (which imply a lower wage elasticity of the uncompensated labor supply) do not
weaken the argument presented in the paper: actually, our results are strengthened.
The basic idea can be grasped looking at equation (27): we have explained in the text that,
following a cut in the tax rate, the change of e x depends on a substitution e®ect related to the
increase in ¡(º;¾;¿) and on an income e®ect due to e cm. The size of the change in ¡(º;¾;¿) is
una®ected by ·, as we can see from equation (15). On the other hand, the size of the increase
in e cm could vary when · is reduced; our intuition is that it is lower, since the increase in the
labor supply and thus in labor income is less strong.
To verify such a reasoning we have simulated the model with lower values of · (½ is set
= 0 as in Section 4.2). Table 4 reports the results for · = ¡8, focusing on g, e x and e cm.
Comparing Table 4 with Table 2 we see that, as expected, the increase in e cm is lower when
26Table 4: E®ects of a 10% reduction in the tax rate on labor income (· = ¡8)
º = 0:0 º = 0:4 º = 0:8 º = 0:9 º = 0:95 º = 0:98
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
g 1:16 0:99 1:16 1:00 1:17 1:03 1:20 1:08 1:25 1:19 1:32 1:38
e x 0:93 0:93 0:94 0:95 0:98 1:03
e cm 1:01 1:02 1:02 1:03 1:04 1:06
· = ¡8; as a consequence, for low values of º, the decrease in e x is stronger and the di®erence in
the growth impact of taxation between Model 1 and Model 2 is more sizable.13 When º = 0:4,
the growth rate in Model 2 is una®ected by the reduction of the tax rate, while in Model 1 it
increases by 16%. When º = 0, the e®ect of a reduction of the tax rate in Model 2 is even
(slightly) negative.
13The choice of · = ¡8 implies that the wage elasticity of the uncompensated labor supply is equal to: 0:3
when º = 0 or º = 0:4; 0:4 when º = 0:8; 0:65 when º = 0:9; 1:1 when º = 0:95; 1:8 when º = 0:98. Notice that
the e®ect that the choice of · has on the wage elasticity of the uncompensated labor supply tends to disappear
when the elasticity of substitution between child care expenditure and parental time is high. This explains why
the di®erence between the results in Table 4 and Table 2 is more sizable when º is low.
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